I have been a member of the governing boards of two state universities (Northern Illinois University and Christopher Newport University), and I have been appalled at what I have read about the mismanagement of the shared governance process at Penn State University and the University of Virginia in recent months.
At the University of Virginia, the Board Chair (called the Rector in Virginia) was reported to have talked to other Board members about her displeasure with the University's President due to the President's failure to give priority attention to pursuing new technological developments in higher education, such as those being offered by other prestigious schools, including Stanford, Harvard and MIT. In a memo explaining her criticism of the President, the Rector stated: "The University of Virginia has no centralized approach to dealing with this potentially transformational development."The Rector of UVA then arranged a meeting with the President and one other Board member to inform the President that the Board intended to fire her at its next meeting. When the Board held its meeting, the Rector followed through and called for a vote to fire the President. When this news hit the campus and the state, it created a firestorm of protest. The loudest protests came from faculty, students and alumni, who were taken completely by surprise by the Board's action.
The protest reached Richmond, and even the Governor, who appoints the members of each state university governing board, threatened the UVA Board to quickly act to resolve the controversy, or he would replace all members of the Board. Within a few days, the Board met again and withdrew its dismissal of the University's President.
Now, this week, it is reported that the University of Virginia has agreed to join a consortium of universities started by an organization named Coursera, which is part of a new wave of massive open online courses, or MOOCs. The development of MOOCs is a new trend that has started among leading institutions of higher education.
"Coursera launched last fall at Stanford, then expanded in April to Princeton, Penn and Michigan. MIT and Harvard responded the following month by re-launching MIT’s global online initiative as edX, with a $30 million investment from each school. Coursera struck back this week by adding 12 new schools to its consortium, including U-Va., Duke, Johns Hopkins and CalTech..... Seven of the top national universities (as measured by U.S. News) are now involved in the MOOC push, along with U-Va., Georgia Tech and the universities of Illinois and Washington among the top publics." http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/college-inc/post/u-va-leaders-appear-not-to-have-known-of-looming-online-deal/2012/07/17/gJQAYXR9qW_blog.html
Following this announcement (the subject of which is directly related to the Board Rector's complaint about the University President when the Board tried to fire the President just one month earlier), it is being speculated in the press that neither the President nor the Board knew last month that some members of the faculty and staff at the University were working on this potential agreement with Coursera. How could that be?
Apparently, the Rector was correct in noting that there is "no centralized approach" at the University for dealing with potential opportunities regarding technological developments in higher education. Otherwise, the President would have known about this possible development when the Rector told her she was going to be fired over this issue.
If the Rector did not tell the President why she was displeased with the President, there must be a basic problem of communication between the President and the Board. There should be on-going dialogue between the University President and key members of the governing board to assure a common understanding of the institution's priorities and future direction. The President and the Board Rector should be communicating on a regular basis to determine the issues to be discussed at Board meetings. All important issues regarding the future direction of the institution are commonly covered in the Board's public meetings at which all board members are present. If there is disagreement about the University's direction, there would be discussion of those issues at the Board meetings, where representatives of other affected constituencies at the University, such as the faculty, administration staff and students, can be in attendance. That is how shared governance in higher education is intended to work.
No governing board should act to fire its President without full discussions of the issues involved. If the need for a better way to seize technological opportunities had been discussed at UVA Board meetings, the President would have learned about the Coursea project in development in order to brief the Board about it. If the Board had problems with Coursea approach, that could have been discussed. It is also likely that the University's leaders would have come to a common understanding of the need for a "centralized approach" to addressing such opportunities.
Penn State has been faced with a much more serious matter and a much more egregious failure of proper oversight by both the governing board and the University's President. The recent trial and conviction of Jerry Sandusky (a retired football coach at Penn State) on 45 counts of abusing underage boys over 15 years has been thoroughly reported in nationwide media. Even after his retirement from Penn State, it was reported by witnesses that Sandusky committed some of the acts in question at Penn State facilities where he was given continued access.
Campus safety must be a priority for every institution of higher education. The failure to report crimes on campus to appropriate authorities is not only required by federal law, but is critical to properly protect the safety of the students attending the school, as well as the employees of the institution.
The two governing boards on which I was a member gave continuing priority attention to campus safety. We would get regular reports from the Chiefs of the Campus Police forces. We would discuss potential risks on campus due to new developments, such as construction sites, new traffic patterns or new walking paths. We sought assurances that campus police were providing adequate coverage of the campus during normal days that school was in session and were prepared for special events when large crowds and heavier than usual traffic was expected.
In addition, the universities' lawyers were consulted by university staff on any new development of significance where the university risked potential liability if proper steps were not taken to assure compliance with the university's legal responsibilities.The lawyers would then inform the governing board about significant liability risks or pending legal issues about which the board should know in order to competently fulfill its oversight responsibilites.
Based on my quick review of the Special Investigative Report recently issued by former FBI Director Louis Freeh's firm into the actions of Penn State officials with regard to Jerry Sandusky, it appears that the University's administration officials whose areas of responsibility included the football program (two of whom will be tried shortly for failure to report certain Sandusky allegations to proper authorities) did not consult University counsel or risk management staff in 1998 when a boy's mother reported an incident in a Penn State shower involving her son and Sandusky to local police. As a result of the police investigation, the District Attorney considered whether to file criminal charges but decided there was not enough evidence of a crime at that time.
Nevertheless, the boy's mother reported the incident to Child Services, and child psychologists interviewed the boy involved, as well as one of his friends who was identified by the first boy as also having experienced Sandusky's special attention in the University shower. While various investigations of the mother's report were being undertaken by campus, local and state officials, one of the top school administrators had the campus police chief keeping him informed of the progress of the investigations. It appears that the main reason he wanted to stay informed was so that he could give reports on the inquiries' developments to the University President and Head Football Coach Joe Paterno.
Even though the District Attorney's office, the state Child Services office and local police all followed up with interviews of the boys involved and Sandusky himself, none of the University staff aware of those investigations appear to have taken those inquiries as a call to action to determine if Sandusky had engaged in similiar acts with other boys in the past or to assure that no such incidents would ever reoccur. In 1998, only the state child services caseworker and the campus police detective engaged in the investigation of the mother's allegation took the step of talking to Sandusky about his behavior and telling him to stop showering with young boys.
After Sandusky retired in 1999, he was given continued access to University facilities. In 2001, he was observed by an assistant football coach again engaging in inappropriate behavior with a young boy in Penn State's showers. The assistant coach reported the incident to Head Coach Paterno, who reported it to the same two officials who had been kept informed of the 1998 investigations. These two officials informed the President about the new Sandusky incident, and one of them consulted the University's outside counsel. Since the advice given by counsel at that time is subject to the attorney-client privilege and all parties involved declined to be interviewed by Freeh's investigators, it is not known what was discussed between the University administrator and the outside counsel in 2001. However, it appears that again no effective action was taken to determine the extent of Sandusky's inappropriate conduct and who his victims may have been or to assure reporting to appropriate authorities or to institute effective steps to prevent future misconduct that could harm other minors.
It also appears that the University's General Counsel was not informed about any of the incidents until she received notice that a Grand Jury would be convened in late 2010. Furthermore, no University officials notified the University Board of Trustees about the 1998 investigation nor the similar allegations reported in 2001. Since university general counsels are commonly involved in all governing board meetings, it appears that the decision to consult outside counsel in 2001 was made to avoid disclosing the Sandusky incidents to Penn State's General Counsel who could have assured disclosure to the governing board long before they first learned about the Sandusky issues in 2011 after a state Grand Jury was convened.
Rather than inform the University's Board about the 2001 incident, the Penn State staff informed the board of the charitable organization (Second Mile Club) for which Sandusky then worked. This Club provided mentoring services to young boys that included sports activities. This gave Sandusky continued opportunities to work with young boys and to take them to Penn State sports facilities for work-outs that ended in showers.
Not only did the University administrative staff most familiar with the Sandusky events fail to take action to inform outside authorities or the University's governing board, but neither did Penn State's President who was repeatedly informed of the various allegations. Beyond that, the Freeh investigation found that the Board of Trustees had no committee structure for receiving reports of potential liability risks to the University.
When the press reported that the University President, Coach Paterno and several members of the University's Athletic Department testified before the state's Grand Jury in March 2011, one of the Trustees who read the reports asked for more information about the investigation. The University President and General Counsel did not brief the Board about the Grand Jury investigation until the Board's next meeting in May 2011. The briefing given did not fully describe the nature of the allegations against Sandusky or cover the potential liability or public relations issues that could arise if indictments would be issued. Apparently, no member of the Board made sufficient inquiries to learn more about the allegations involved or how the University's administration had been responding to the issues involved.
Freeh's report concluded that, from March 2011 (when press reports disclosed the Grand Jury proceedings) to November 2011, the Board did not take any action to protect the University, such as engaging outside counsel to conduct an independent investigation or preparing the University for the consequences or reactions to possible Grand Jury action.
The first time the President informed anyone on the governing board about the allegations was in April 2011 when he informed the Board Chairman about the Grand Jury investigation prior to the Board meeting in May. If the Board Chairman knew the gravity of the allegations and the potential exposure to the University, he did not inform any others on the Board until it was learned that Sandusky and the two University administrators discussed above were about to be indicted. After the indictments were announced in early November, Penn State's President decided to more fully inform the whole Board about the nature of the charges by conference call.
Within a few days after the full Board learned about the indictments, the Board Chair stepped aside and turned over his duties to the Vice Chair. The Board decided to terminate the President, Head Coach Paterno and one of the staff members. The other staff member was put on administrative leave. The Board also decided to start the special investigation by Louis Freeh's firm.
The conclusions of the Freeh investigation spell out continuing failures by key Penn State officials and the University's Board to effectively oversee University activities to assure proper safeguards are in place to protect the institution against severe liability risks and/or criminal acts within the University's scope of responsibility. There was apparently no standard practice to have the Penn State Board routinely informed about major risks or potential liabilities. Without such information, the Board would not be able to make needed inquiries about the extent of risks reported. Furthermore, even after the Board first learned about the Grand Jury proceeding through the press (not University officials), it took no action to seek more information about what led the state to convene the Grand Jury and how the proceeding might affect Penn State and the community that depends on it.
The boards on which I was a member had committees that provided oversight of specified areas of responsibilty, such as finances, campus life and safety, student affairs and academic matters. At the committee meetings, we would have the responsible staff members report on university activities and developments about which the board should be kept informed. The committee structure allowed us to ask questions and make further inquiries into matters of concern. Committee chairmen would then report on their committee meetings to the full board at its regular meetings. I found nothing in the Freeh report that suggests that such oversight mechanisms were in place at Penn State.
The Freeh report on the failures of Penn State's governance systems and the inappropriate actions of its key officials for more than a decade is a disturbing description of mismanagement and governing board malpractice that is shocking for such a well-known high profile institution. The report can be found at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303740704577522603440183734.html#project%3DFREEHREPORT%26articleTabs%3Dinteractive
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UPDATE: On July 23, 2012, the NCAA announced sanctions against the Penn State football program as a result of the Sandusky case. Among the sanctions are common sense actions that should have been taken by the University's senior management and its Board of Trustees over a decade ago. Specifically, the following NCAA requirements could have been implemented by the University, instead of hiding the embarrassing criminal conduct of one of the football program's former coaches who continued to enjoy access to the school's facilities:
"Penn State and the NCAA agreed that the university will follow a number of conditions and requirements imposed by the association. Among those is that Penn State adopt all the recommendations in the Freeh Report. Among those are that the university:
—Hire an independent monitor of the athletic department who will report to the NCAA, the Big Ten Conference and the Penn State Board of Trustees quarterly on the school’s progress and make recommendations to help implement the terms of the agreement. The selection of the monitor will be done by the NCAA, in consultation with the Big Ten and the university
—Appoint a compliance officer and have him or her lead a council of faculty and senior administrators that will oversee ethical and legal matters.
—Create a hotline for anonymous questions or disclosure of issues regarding athletic department and NCAA issues.
—Provide yearly training on “issues of ethics, civility, standards of conduct and reporting of violations.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-and-big-ten-sanctions-of-penn-state-announced-monday/2012/07/23/gJQA5Upb4W_story.html?tid=pm_sports_pop
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